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Abstract
We study the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocat-
ing m indivisible items among n asymmetric agents with submodular valuations. The NSW is
a well-established notion of fairness and efficiency, defined as the weighted geometric mean of
agents’ valuations. For special cases of the problem with symmetric agents and additive(-like)
valuation functions, approximation algorithms have been designed using approaches customized
for these specific settings, and they fail to extend to more general settings. Hence, no approx-
imation algorithm with factor independent of m is known either for asymmetric agents with
additive valuations or for symmetric agents beyond additive(-like) valuations.
In this paper, we extend our understanding of the NSW problem to far more general settings.
Our main contribution is two approximation algorithms for asymmetric agents with additive and
submodular valuations respectively. Both algorithms are simple to understand and involve non-
trivial modifications of a greedy repeated matchings approach. Allocations of high valued items
are done separately by un-matching certain items and re-matching them, by processes that are
different in both algorithms. We show that these approaches achieve approximation factors of
O(n) and O(n logn) for additive and submodular case respectively, which is independent of the
number of items. For additive valuations, our algorithm outputs an allocation that also achieves
the fairness property of envy-free up to one item (EF1).
Furthermore, we show that the NSW problem under submodular valuations is strictly harder
than all currently known settings with an e
e−1
factor of the hardness of approximation, even
for constantly many agents. For this case, we provide a different approximation algorithm that
achieves a factor of e
e−1
, hence resolving it completely.
1 Introduction
We study the problem of approximating the maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocating
a set G of m indivisible items among a set A of n agents with non-negative monotone submodular
valuations vi : 2G → R+, and unequal or asymmetric entitlements called agent weights. Let Πn(G)
denote the set of all allocations, i.e., {(x1, . . . ,xn) | ∪i xi = G; xi ∩ xj = ∅,∀i 6= j}. The NSW
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problem is to find an allocation maximizing the following weighted geometric mean of valuations,
argmax
(x1,...,xn)∈Πn(G)
(∏
i∈A
vi(xi)ηi
)1/∑
i∈A
ηi
, (1)
where ηi is the weight of agent i. We call this the Asymmetric Submodular NSW problem.1 When
agents are symmetric, ηi = 1,∀i ∈ A.
Fair and efficient allocation of resources is a central problem in economic theory. The NSW
objective provides an interesting trade-off between the two extremal objectives of social welfare
(i.e., sum of valuations) and max-min fairness, and in contrast to both it is invariant to individual
scaling of each agent’s valuations (see [Mou03] for additional characteristics). It was indepen-
dently discovered by three different communities as a solution of the bargaining problem in classic
game theory [Nas50], a well-studied notion of proportional fairness in networking [Kel97], and
coincides with the celebrated notion of competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) in eco-
nomics [Var74]. While Nash [Nas50] only considered the symmetric case, [HS72, Kal77] proposed
the asymmetric case, which has also been extensively studied, and used in many different applica-
tions, e.g., bargaining theory [LV07, CM10, Tho86], water allocation [HdLGY14, DWL+18], climate
agreements [YvIWZ17], and many more.
The NSW problem is known to be notoriously hard, e.g., NP-hard even for two agents with
identical additive valuations, and APX-hard in general [Lee17].2 Efforts were then diverted to de-
velop efficient approximation algorithms. A series of remarkable works [CG18, CDG+17, AGSS17,
AMGV18, BKV18, GHM19, CCG+18] provide good approximation guarantees for the special sub-
classes of this problem where agents are symmetric and have additive(-like) valuation functions3
via utilizing ingenious different approaches. All these approaches exploit the symmetry of agents
and the characteristics of additive-like valuation functions,4 which makes them hard to extend to
the asymmetric case and more general valuation functions. As a consequence, no approximation
algorithm with a factor independent of the number of items m [NR14] is known either for asym-
metric agents with additive valuations or for symmetric agents beyond additive(-like) valuations.
These questions are also raised in [CDG+17, BKV18].
The NSW objective also serves as a major focal point in fair division. For the case of symmetric
agents with additive valuations, Caragiannis et al. [CKM+16] present a compelling argument in
favor of the ‘unreasonable’ fairness of maximum NSW by showing that such an allocation has
outstanding properties, namely, it is EF1 (a popular fairness property of envy-freeness up to one
item) as well as Pareto optimal (PO), a standard notion of economic efficiency. Even though
computing a maximum NSW allocation is hard, its approximation recovers most of the fairness and
efficiency guarantees; see e.g., [BKV18, CCG+18, GM19].
In this paper, we extend our understanding of the NSW problem to far more general settings.
Our main contribution is two approximation algorithms, SMatch and RepReMatch for asymmet-
ric agents with additive and submodular valuations respectively. Both algorithms are simple to
1In the rest of this paper, we refer to various special cases of the problem as the α µ NSW problem, where α is
the nature of agents, symmetric or asymmetric, and µ is the type of agent valuation functions. We skip one or both
qualifiers when they are clear from the context.
2Observe that the partition problem reduces to the NSW problem with two identical agents.
3Slight generalizations of additive valuations are studied: budget additive [GHM19], separable piecewise linear
concave (SPLC) [AMGV18], and their combination [CCG+18].
4For instance, the notion of a maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) item is critically used in most of these approaches.
There is no such equivalent notion for the submodular case.
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understand and involve non-trivial modifications of a greedy repeated matchings approach. Allo-
cations of high valued items are done separately by un-matching certain items and re-matching
them, by processes that are different in both algorithms. We show that these approaches achieve
approximation factors of O(n) and O(n log n) for additive and submodular case respectively, which
is independent of the number of items. For additive valuations, our algorithm outputs an allocation
that is also EF1.
1.1 Model
We formally define the valuation functions we consider in this paper, and their relations to other
popular functions. For convenience, we also use vi(j) instead of vi({j}) to denote the valuation of
agent i for item j.
1. Additive: Given valuation vi(j) of each agent i for every item j, the valuation for a set of
items is the sum of the individual valuations. That is, ∀S ⊆ G, vi(S) = ∑j∈S vi(j). In the
restricted additive case, vi(j) = {0, vj},∀i.
2. Budget additive (BA): Every agent has an upper cap on the maximum valuation she can
receive from any allocation. For any set of items, the agent’s total valuation is the minimum
value from the additive value of this set and the cap. i.e., ∀S ⊆ G, vi(S) = min{
∑
j∈S vi(j), ci},
where ci denotes agent i’s cap.
3. Separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC): In this case, there are multiple copies of each
item. The valuation of an agent is piecewise linear concave for each item, and it is additively
separable across items. Let vi(j, k) denote the agent i’s value for receiving kth copy of item
j. Concavity implies that vi(j, 1) ≥ vi(j, 2) . . . ,∀i, j. The valuation of agent i for a set S of
items, containing lj copies of items j, is vi(S) =∑j∑ljk=1 vi(j, k).
4. Monotone Submodular: Let vi(S1 | S2) denote the marginal utility of agent i for a set S1 of
items over set S2, where S1,S2 ⊆ G and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. Then, the valuation function of every
agent is a monotonically non decreasing function vi : 2G → R+ that satisfies the submodularity
constraint that for all i ∈ A, h ∈ G,S1,S2 ⊆ G,
vi(h | S1 ∪ S2) ≤ vi(h | S1).
Other popular valuation functions are OXS, gross substitutes (GS), XOS and subadditive [NTRV07].
These function classes are related as follows:
Additive (
SPLC ( OXS
BA
( GS ( Submodular ( XOS ( subadditive .
1.2 Results
Table 1.2 summarizes approximation guarantees of the algorithms RepReMatch and SMatch under
popular valuation functions, formally defined in Section 1.1. Here, the approximation guarantee of
an algorithm is defined as α for an α ≥ 1, if it outputs an allocation whose (weighted) geometric
mean is at least 1/α times the maximum (optimal) geometric mean. All current best known results
are also stated in the table for reference.
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Valuations
Symmetric Agents Asymmetric Agents
Hardness Algorithm Hardness Algorithm
Restricted Additive 1.069 [GHM19] 1.45[BKV18] [S] 1.069 [GHM19] O(n) [S]
Additive —"— 1.45 [BKV18] —"— —"—
Budget additive
—"— 1.45 [CCG+18] —"— —"—
SPLC
OXS
—"— O(n log n) [R] —"— O(n log n) [R]
Gross substitutes
Submodular 1.5819 [Thm 4.1] —"— 1.5819 [Thm 4.1] —"—
XOS
—"— O(m) [NR14] —"— O(m) [NR14]
Subadditive
Table 1: Summary of results. Every entry has the best known approximation guarantee for the
setting followed by the reference, from this paper or otherwise, that establishes it. Here, [S] and
[R] respectively refer to Algorithms SMatch and RepReMatch.
To complement these results, we also provide a ee−1 = 1.5819-factor hardness of approximation
result for the submodular NSW problem in Section 4. This hardness even applies to the case when
the number of agents is constant. This shows that the general problem is strictly harder than the
settings studied so far, for which 1.45 factor approximation algorithms are known.
For the special case of the submodular NSW problem where the number of agents is constant,
we describe another algorithm with a matching 1.5819 approximation factor in Section 5, hence
resolving this case completely. Finally in the same section, we show that for the symmetric additive
NSW problem, the allocation of items returned by SMatch also satisfies EF1. Finally, a 1.45-factor
guarantee can be shown for the further special case of restricted additive valuations, by showing
that the allocation returned by the algorithm in this case is PO. This matches the current best
known approximation factor for this case.
1.3 Techniques
We describe the techniques used in this work in a pedagogical manner. We start with a naive algo-
rithm, and build progressively more sophisticated algorithms by fixing the main issues that result
in bad approximation factors for the corresponding algorithms, finally ending with our algorithms.
All approaches compute, sometimes multiple, maximum weight matchings of weighted bipartite
graphs. These graphs have agents and items in separate parts, and the edge weight assigned for
matching an item j to an agent i is the logarithm of the valuation of the agent for the item,
scaled by the agent’s weight, i.e., ηi log vi(j). Observe that, by taking the logarithm of the NSW
objective (1), we get an equivalent problem where the objective is to maximize the weighted sum
of logarithms of agents’ valuations.
Let us first consider the additive NSW problem, and see what NSW is assured by computing
a single such maximum weight matching. If the number of agents, say n, and items, say m, is
the same, then the allocation obtained by matching items to agents according to such a matching
results in the maximum NSW objective. [NR14] extend this algorithm to the general case, by
allocating n items according to one matching, and arbitrarily allocating the remaining items. They
prove that this gives an (m− n+ 1)−factor approximation algorithm.
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A natural extension to this algorithm is to compute more matchings instead of arbitrary allo-
cations after a single matching. That is, compute one maximum weight matching, allocate items
according to this matching, then repeat this process until all items are allocated. This repeated
matching algorithm still does not help us get rid of the dependence on m in the approximation
factor. To see why, consider the following example.
Example 1.1. Consider 2 agents A,B with weights 1 each, and m + 1 items. The valuations of
A and B for the first item are M + ǫ and M respectively. Agent A values each of the remaining
items at 1, while B only values the last of these at 1, and values remaining (m − 1) items at 0.
An allocation that optimizes the NSW of the agents allocates the first item to B, and allocate all
remaining items to A. The optimal geometric mean is (Mm)1/2. A repeated matching algorithm,
in the first iteration, allocates the first item to A, and the last to B. No matching can now give non
zero valuation to B. The maximum geometric mean that can be generated by such an algorithm is
((M + ǫ +m− 1)1)1/2 < √M +m. Thus, using M := m, the ratio of these two geometric means
depends on m.
The above example shows the critical reason why a vanilla repeated matching algorithm may
not work. In the initial matchings, the algorithm has no knowledge of how the agents value the
entire set of items. Hence during these matchings it might allocate the high valued items to the
wrong agents, thereby reducing the NSW by a large factor. To get around this problem, our
algorithm needs to have some knowledge of an agent’s valuation for the unallocated (low valued)
set of items, while deciding how to allocate high valued items. It can then allocate the high valued
items correctly with this foresight.
It turns out that there is a simple way to provide this foresight when the valuation functions
are additive(-like). Effectively, we keep aside O(n) high valued items of each agent, and assign the
other items via a repeated matching algorithm. We then assign the items we had set aside to all
agents via matchings that locally maximize the resulting NSW objective. The collective set of items
put aside by all agents will have all the high valued items that required the foresight for correct
allocation as a subset. Because these items are allocated after allocating the low valued items, this
algorithm allocates the high valued items more smartly. In Section 2, we describe this algorithm,
termed SMatch, and show that it gives an O(n) factor approximation for the NSW objective.
The above idea, however, does not work for submodular valuation functions. The main, subtle
reason is as follows. Even in the additive case, the idea actually requires to keep aside not the
set of items with highest valuation, but the set of items that leave a set of lowest valuation. For
additive valuations, these sets are the same. However, it is known from [SF11] that finding a set of
items of minimum valuation with lower bounded cardinality for monotone submodular functions is
inapproximable within
√
m/ logm factor, where m is the number of items.
We get around this issue and get the foresight for assigning high valued items in a different way.
Interestingly, we use the technique of repeated matchings itself for this. In algorithm RepReMatch,
we allocate items via repeated matchings, then release some of the initial matchings and re-match
the items of these initial matchings.
The idea is that the initial matchings will allocate all high valued items, even if incorrectly, and
give us the set of items that must be allocated correctly. If the total number of all high valued
items depends only on n, then the problem of maximizing the NSW objective when allocating this
set of items is solved up to some factor of n by applying a repeated matching algorithm. In Lemma
3.3 we prove such an upper bound on the number of initial matchings to be released.
Thus far, we have proved that we can allocate one set of items, the high valued items, ap-
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proximately optimally. Now submodular valuations do not allow us to add valuations incurred in
separate matchings to compute the total valuation of an agent. Getting such a repeated matchings
type cumulative approach result in high total valuation requires the following natural modification
in the approach. We redefine the edge weights used for computing matchings. We now consider
the marginal valuations over items already allocated in previous matchings as edge weights rather
than individual valuations.
There are several challenges to prove this approach gives an allocation of high NSW overall.
First, bounding the amount of valuation received by a particular agent as a fraction of her optimal
allocation is difficult. This is because the subset of items allocated by the algorithm might be
completely different from the set of optimal items. We can however give a relation between these
two values and this is seen in Lemma 3.2.
Then, since we release and reallocate the items of initial matchings, now the set of items
allocated to an agent can be completely different from the set before, changing all marginal utilities
completely. It is thus non-trivial to combine the valuations from these stages too. This is done in
the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Apart from this, we also have the following results in the paper that use different techniques.
Submodular NSW with constant number of agents. We completely resolve this case using a
different approach that uses techniques of maximizing submodular functions over matroids devel-
oped in [CVZ10] and a reduction from [Von08]. At a high level, we first maximize the continuous
relaxations of agent valuation functions, then round them using a randomized algorithm to obtain
an integral allocation of items. The two key results used in designing the algorithm are Theorems
5.2 and 5.3.
Hardness of approximation. The submodular ALLOCATION problem is to maximize the sum
of valuations of agents over integral allocations of items. [KLMM08] describe a reduction of
MAX-3-COLORING, which is NP-Hard to approximate within a constant factor, to ALLOCATION.
We prove that this reduction also establishes the same hardness for the submodular NSW problem.
1.4 Further Related Work
An extensive work has been done on special cases of the NSW problem. For the symmetric additive
NSW problem, several constant-factor approximation algorithms have been obtained. The first
such algorithm used an approach based on a variant of Fisher markets [CG18], to achieve an
approximation factor of 2 · e1/e ≈ 2.889. Later, the analysis of this algorithm was improved
to 2 [CDG+17]. Another approach based on the theory of real stable polynomials gave an e-
factor guarantee [AGSS17]. Recently, [BKV18] obtained the current best approximation factor of
e1/e ≈ 1.45 using an approach based on approximate EF1 and PO allocation. These approaches have
also been extended to provide constant-factor approximation algorithms for slight generalizations
of additive valuations, namely the budget additive [GHM19], SPLC [AMGV18], and a common
generalization of these two valuations [CCG+18].
All these approaches exploit the symmetry of agents and the characteristics of additive-like
valuation functions. For instance, the notion of a maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) item is critically
used in most of these approaches. There is no such equivalent notion for the submodular case. This
makes them hard to extend to the asymmetric case and to more general valuation functions.
Fair and efficient division of items to asymmetric agents with submodular valuations is an
important problem, also raised in [CDG+17]. However, the only known result for this general
problem is an O(m)-factor algorithm [NR14], where m is the number of items.
6
Two other popular welfare objectives are the social welfare and max-min. In social welfare, the
goal is to maximize the sum of valuations of all agents and in the max-min objective, the goal is to
maximize the value of lowest-valued agent. The latter objective is also termed as the Santa Claus
problem for the restricted additive valuations [BS06].
The social welfare problem under submodular valuations has been completely resolved with a
e
e−1 = 1.5819-factor algorithm [Von08] and a matching hardness result [KLMM08]. Note that the
additive case for this problem has a trivial linear time algorithm, hence it is perhaps unsurprising
that a constant factor algorithm would exist for the submodular case.
For the max-min objective, extensive work has been done on the restricted additive valuations
case, resulting in constant factor algorithms for the same [AKS15, DRZ18]. However, for the
unrestricted additive valuations the best approximation factor is O(
√
n log3 n) [AS10]. For the
submodular Santa Claus problem, there is an O(n) factor algorithm [KP07]. On the other hand, a
hardness factor of 2 is the best known lower bound for both settings [BD05].
Organization of the paper: In Section 2, we describe the algorithm SMatch and analysis for
the additive NSW problem. In Section 3, we present the algorithm RepReMatch for submodular
valuations. Section 4 contains the hardness proof for the submodular setting. The results for the
special cases of submodular NSW with constant number of agents, symmetric additive NSW, and
symmetric additive NSW with restricted valuations are presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we
present counter examples to prove tightness of the analysis of Algorithms RepReMatch and SMatch.
The final Section 7 discusses possible further directions.
2 Additive Valuations
In this section, we present SMatch, described in Algorithm 1, for the asymmetric additive NSW
problem, and prove the following approximation result.
Theorem 2.1. The NSW objective of allocation x, output by SMatch for asymmetric additive NSW
problem, is at least 1/2n times the optimal NSW, denoted as OPT, i.e., NSW(x) ≥ 1
2n
OPT.
SMatch is a single pass algorithm that allocates up to one item to every agent per iteration such
that the NSW objective is locally maximized. An issue with a naive single pass, locally optimizing
greedy approach is that the initial iterations work on highly limited information. As shown in
Example 1.1, such algorithms can result in outcomes with very low NSW even for symmetric agents
with additive valuation functions. In the example, although agent A can be allocated an item of
high valuation later, the algorithm does not know this initially. Algorithm 1 resolves this issue by
pre-computing an approximate value that the agents will receive in later iterations, and uses this
information in the edge weight definitions when allocating the first item to every agent. We now
discuss the details of SMatch.
2.1 Algorithm
SMatch works in a single pass. For every agent, the algorithm first computes the value of m− 2n
least valued items and stores this in ui. SMatch then defines a weighted complete bipartite graph
Γ(A,G,W) with edge weights w(i, j) = ηi log
(
vi(j) + uin
)
, and allocates one item to each agent
along the edges of a maximum weight matching of Γ. It then starts allocating items via repeated
matchings. Until all items are allocated, SMatch iteratively defines graphs Γ(A,Grem,W) with
Grem denoting the set of unallocated items and edge weights defined as w(i, j) = ηi log (vi + vi(j)),
7
where vi is the valuation of agent i for items that are allocated to her. SMatch then allocates at
most one item to each agent according to a maximum weight matching of Γ.
Algorithm 1: SMatch for the Asymmetric Additive NSW problem
Input : A set A of n agents with weights ηi, ∀i ∈ A, a set G of m indivisible items, and
additive valuations vi : 2G → R+, where vi(S) is the valuation of agent i ∈ A for a
set of items S ⊆ G.
Output: An allocation that approximately optimizes the NSW.
1 xi ← ∅, ui ← vi(Gi,[2n+1:m]) ∀i ∈ [n] // Gi,[a:b] defined in Section 2.2
2 Define weighted complete bipartite graph Γ(A,G,W) with weights
W = {w(i, j) | w(i, j) = ηi log
(
vi(j) + uin
)
,∀i ∈ A, j ∈ G}
3 Compute a maximum weight matching M for Γ
4 xi ← xi ∪ {j | (i, j) ∈M}, ∀i ∈ A // allocate items according to M
5 Grem ← G\{j | (i, j) ∈M} // update set of unallocated items
6 while Grem 6= ∅ do
7 Define weighted complete bipartite graph Γ(A,Grem,W) with weights
W = {w(i, j) | w(i, j) = ηi log(vi(j) + vi(xi)),∀i ∈ A, j ∈ Grem}
8 Compute a maximum weight matching M for Γ
9 xi ← xi ∪ {j | (i, j) ∈M}, ∀i ∈ A // allocate items according to M
10 Grem ← Grem\{j | (i, j) ∈M} // remove allocated items
11 end
12 Return x
2.2 Notation
In the following discussion, we use xi = {h1i , . . . , hτii } to denote the set of τi items received by agent
i in SMatch. We use x∗i = {g1i , . . . , gτ
∗
i
i } to denote the set of τ∗i items in i’s optimal bundle. Then
for every i, all items in xi and G are ranked according to the decreasing utilities as per vi. We use
the shorthand [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let Gi,[a:b] denotes the items ranked from a to
b according to agent i in G, and xi,1:t is the total allocation to agent i from the first t matching
iterations. We also use Gi,k to denote the kth ranked item of agent i from the entire set of items.
For all i, we define ui as the minimum value for the remaining set of items upon removing at most
2n items from G, i.e., ui = minS⊆G,|S|≤2n vi(G \ S) = Gi,[2n+1,m].5
2.3 Analysis
To establish the guarantee of Theorem 2.1, we first prove a couple of lemmas.
Lemma 2.1. vi(hti) ≥ vi(Gi,tn).
Proof. Since every iteration of SMatch allocates at most n items, at the start of iteration t at most
(t − 1)n items are allocated. Thus at least n items from G ranked between 1 to tn by agent i are
5As the valuation functions are monotone, the minimum value will be obtained by removing exactly 2n items.
The less than accounts for the case when the number of items in G is fewer than 2n.
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still unallocated. In the tth iteration the agent will thus get an item with value at least the value
of Gi,tn and the lemma follows.
Lemma 2.2. vi(h2i , . . . , h
τi
i ) ≥ uin .
Proof. Using Lemma 2.1 and since vi(Gi,tn) ≥ vi(Gi,tn+k), ∀k ∈ [n − 1]
vi(hti) ≥
1
n
vi(Gi,[tn:(t+1)n−1]) .
Thus,
vi(h2i , . . . , h
τi
i ) =
τi∑
t=2
vi(hti) ≥
1
n
τi∑
t=2
vi(Gi,[tn:(t+1)n−1]) .
As at most n items are allocated in every iteration, agent i receives items for at least ⌊mn ⌋ iterations.6
This implies that (τi + 1)n ≥ m and hence,
vi(h2i , . . . , h
τi
i ) ≥
1
n
(
vi(Gi,[2n:m−1])
)
≥ 1
n
(
vi(Gi,[2n+1:m])
)
=
1
n
ui .
The second inequality follows as vi(Gi,2n) ≥ vi(Gi,m).
We now prove the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2.1.
NSW(x) =
n∏
i=1
(
vi(h1i , . . . , h
τi
i )
ηi
) 1∑n
i=1
ηi
=
n∏
i=1
((
vi(h1i ) + vi(h
2
i . . . , h
τi
i )
)ηi) 1∑n
i=1
ηi
≥
n∏
i=1
((
vi(h1i ) +
ui
n
)ηi) 1∑n
i=1
ηi ,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.2. During the allocation of the first item h1i , items
g1i of all agents are available. Thus, allocating each agent her own g
1
i is a feasible first matching
and we get
NSW(x) ≥
n∏
i=1
((
vi(g1i ) +
ui
n
)ηi) 1∑n
i=1
ηi .
Now, ui = minS⊆G,|S|≤2n vi(G \ S). Suppose we define, S∗i = argmin|S|≤2n,S⊆x∗i vi(x∗i \ S), then
vi(x∗i \ S∗i ) ≤ ui. It follows by using Si = argminS⊆G,|S|≤2n vi(G \ S), we get ui = vi(G \ Si) ≥
vi(x∗i \ Si) ≥ vi(x∗i \ S∗i ). Thus,
NSW(x) ≥
n∏
i=1
((
1
2n
vi(S∗i ) +
1
n
vi(x∗i \ S∗i )
)ηi) 1∑
i
ηi
≥ 1
2n
n∏
i=1
(vi(x∗i )
ηi)
1∑n
i=1
ηi =
1
2n
OPT .
6Here we assume that the agents have non-zero valuation for every item. If it does not, the other case is also
straightforward and the lemma continues to hold.
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Remark 2.1. When SMatch is applied to the instance of Example 1.1, it results in a better allo-
cation than that of a naive repeated matching approach. Stage 1 of SMatch computes ui as m− 2n
and 0 for A and B respectively. When this value is included in the edge weight of the first bipartite
graph Γ, the resulting matching gives B the first item, and A some other item. Subsequently A gets
all remaining items, resulting in an allocation having the optimal NSW.
The algorithm SMatch easily extends to budget additive (BA) and separable piecewise concave
(SPLC) valuations using the following small changes: In BA, ui := min(ci,G1,[2n+1:m]) where ci is
the utility cap for agent i, and in SPLC, ui needs to be calculated while considering each copy of an
item as a separate item. In both cases, the edge weights in the bipartite graphs will use marginal
utility (as we use in the submodular valuations case in Section 3). Lemma 2.2 and the subsequent
proofs can be easily extended for these cases by combining ideas from Lemma 3.2 and Proof of
Theorem 3.1. Thus, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2. The NSW objective of allocation x, output by SMatch for asymmetric BA (and
SPLC) NSW problem, is at least 1/2n times the optimal NSW, denoted as OPT, i.e., NSW(x) ≥
1
2n
OPT.
3 Submodular Valuations
In this section we present the RepReMatch, given in Algorithm 2, for approximating the NSW
objective under submodular valuations. We will prove the following relation between the NSW of
the allocation x returned by RepReMatch and the optimal geometric mean OPT.
Theorem 3.1. The NSW objective of allocation x, output by RepReMatch for asymmetric sub-
modular NSW problem, is at least 1/2n(log n+2) times the optimal NSW, denoted as OPT, i.e.,
NSW(x) ≥ 1
2n(log n+2)OPT.
3.1 Algorithm
RepReMatch takes as input an instance of the NSW problem, denoted by (A,G,V), where A is the
set of agents, G is the set of items, and V = {v1, v2 . . . , vn} is the set of agents’ monotone submodular
valuation functions, and generates an allocation vector x. Each agent i ∈ A is associated with a
positive weight ηi.
RepReMatch runs in three phases. In the first phase, in every iteration, we define a weighted
complete bipartite graph Γ(A,Grem,W) as follows. Grem is the set of items that are still unallocated
(Grem = G initially). The weight of edge (i, j), i ∈ A, j ∈ Grem, denoted by w(i, j) ∈ W, is defined
as the logarithm of the valuation of the agent for the singleton set having this item, scaled by the
agent’s weight. That is, w(i, j) = ηi log(vi(j)). We then compute a maximum weight matching in
this graph, and allocate to agents the items they were matched to (if any). This process is repeated
for ⌈log n⌉ iterations.
We perform a similar repeated matching process in the second phase, with different edge weight
definitions for the graphs Γ. We start this phase by assigning empty bundles to all agents. Here,
the weight of an edge between agent i and item j is defined as the logarithm of the valuation of
agent i for the set of items currently allocated to her in Phase 2 of RepReMatch, scaled by her
weight. That is, if we denote the items allocated in t iterations of Phase 2 as x2i,t, in (t + 1)
st
iteration, w(i, j) = ηi log(vi(x2i,t ∪ {j})).
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In the final phase, we re-match the items allocated in Phase 1. We release these items from their
agents, and define Grem as union of these items. We define Γ by letting the edge weights reflect the
total valuation of the agent upon receiving the corresponding item, i.e., w(i, j) = ηi log(vi(x2i ∪{j})),
where x2i is the final set of items allocated to i in Phase 2. We compute one maximum weight
matching for Γ so defined, and allocate all items along the matched edges. All remaining items
are then arbitrarily allocated. The final allocations to all agents, denoted as x = {xi}i∈A, is the
output of RepReMatch.
Algorithm 2: RepReMatch for the Asymmetric Submodular NSW problem
Input : A set A of n agents with weights ηi, ∀i ∈ A, a set G of m indivisible items, and
valuations vi : 2G → R+, where vi(S) is the valuation of agent i ∈ A for a set of
items S ⊆ G.
Output: An allocation that approximately optimizes the NSW objective
Phase 1:
1 x1i ← ∅, ∀i ∈ A // x1i ’s store the set of items allocated in Phase 1
2 Grem ← G // set of unallocated items before every iteration
3 t← 0 // iteration counter
4 while Grem 6= ∅ and t ≤ ⌈log n⌉ do
5 Define weighted complete bipartite graph Γ(A,Grem,W) with weights
W = {w(i, j) | w(i, j) = ηi log(vi(j)),∀i ∈ A, j ∈ Grem}
6 Compute a maximum weight matching M for Γ
7 x1i ← x1i ∪ {j}, ∀(i, j) ∈M // allocate items to agents according to M
8 Grem ← Grem\{j | (i, j) ∈M}; t← t+ 1 // remove allocated items
9 end
Phase 2:
10 For all i, x2i ← ∅ // x2i ’s are the sets of items allocated in Phase 2
11 while Grem 6= ∅ do
12 Define weighted complete bipartite graph Γ(A,Grem,W) with weights
W = {w(i, j) | w(i, j) = ηi log(vi(x2i ∪ {j})),∀i ∈ A, j ∈ Grem}
13 Compute a maximum weight matching M for Γ
14 x2i ← x2i ∪ {j}, ∀(i, j) ∈M // allocate items to agents according to M
15 Grem ← Grem\{j | (i, j) ∈M} // remove allocated items
16 end
Phase 3:
17 Grem ← ⋃i x1i // release items allocated in Phase 1
18 Define weighted complete bipartite graph Γ(A,Grem,W) with
W = {w(i, j) | w(i, j) = ηi log(vi(x2i ∪ {j})),∀i ∈ A, j ∈ Grem}
19 Compute a maximum weight matching M for Γ
20 x2i ← x2i ∪ {j}, ∀(i, j) ∈M // allocate items to agents according to M
21 Arbitrarily allocate rest of the items to agents, let x = {xi}i∈A denote the final allocation
22 return x
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3.2 Notation
There are three phases in RepReMatch. We denote the set of items received by agent i in Phase
p ∈ {1, 2, 3} by xpi , and its size |xpi | by τpi . Similarly, xi and τi respectively denote the final set
of items received by agent i and the size of this set. Note that Phase 3 releases and re-allocates
selected items of Phase 1, thus τi is not equal to τ1i + τ
2
i + τ
3
i . The items allocated to the agents in
Phase 2 are denoted by x2i = {h1i , h2i . . . , hτ
2
i
i }. We also refer to the complete set of items received
in iterations 1 to t of Phase p by xpi,t, for any p ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
For the analysis, the marginal utility of an agent i for an item j over a set of items S is denoted
by vi(j | S) = vi({j} ∪ S) − vi(S). Similarly, we denote by vi(S1 | S2) the marginal utility of set
S1 of items over set S2 where S1,S2 ⊆ G and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. We use x∗ = {x∗i | i ∈ A} to denote the
optimal allocation of all items that maximizes the NSW, and τ∗i for |x∗i |. For every agent i, items in
x∗i are ranked so that g
j
i is the item that gives i the highest marginal utility over all higher ranked
items. That is, for j = 1, g1i is the item that gives i the highest marginal utility over ∅, and for all
2 ≤ j ≤ τ∗i , gji = argmaxg∈x∗
i
\{g1
i
,...,gj−1
i
}
vi(g | {g1i , . . . , gj−1i }).7
We let x¯∗i denote the set of items from x
∗
i that are not allocated (to any agent) at the end of
Phase 1, and we denote by v¯∗i = vi(x¯
∗
i ) and τ¯
∗
i = |x¯∗i | respectively the total valuation and number
of these items. For convenience, to specify the valuation for a set of items S1 = {s11, . . . sk11 },
instead of vi({s11, . . . , sk11 }), we also use vi(s11, . . . , sk11 ). Similarly, while defining the marginal utility
of a set S2 = {s12, . . . , sk22 } over S1 instead of writing vi({s12, . . . , sk22 } | {s11, . . . , sk11 }), we also use
vi(s
1
2, . . . , s
k2
2 | s11, . . . , sk11 ).
3.3 Analysis
We will prove Theorem 3.1 using a series of supporting lemmas. We first prove that in Phase 2,
the minimum marginal utility of an item allocated to an agent over her current allocation from
previous iterations of Phase 2 is not too small. This is the main result that allows us to bound the
minimum valuation of the set of items allocated in Phase 2.
In the tth iteration of Phase 2, RepReMatch finds a maximum weight matching. Here, the
algorithm tries to assign to each agent an item that gives her the maximum marginal utility over
her currently allocated set of items. However, every agent is competing with n − 1 other agents
to get this item. So, instead of receiving the best item, she might lose a few high ranked items to
other agents. Consider the intersection of the set of items that agent i loses to other agents in the
tth iteration with the set of items left from her optimal bundle at the beginning of tth iteration. We
will refer to this set of items by Sti . Let the number of items in Sti be kti .
For the analysis of RepReMatch, we also introduce the notion of attainable items for every
iteration. Sti is the set of an agent’s preferred items that she lost to other agents. The items that
are now left are referred as the set of attainable items of the agent. Note that in any matching, every
agent gets an item equivalent to her best attainable item, that is, an item for which her marginal
valuation (over her current allocation) is at least equal to that from her highest marginally valued
attainable item.
For all i, we denote the intersection of the set of attainable items in the tth iteration and
agent i’s optimal bundle x∗i by x¯
∗
i,t, and let u
∗
i = vi(x¯
∗
i,1) = vi(x¯
∗
i \ S1i ) be the total valuation of
7Since the valuations are monotone submodular, this ensures that vi(g
j
i | {g
1
i , . . . , g
j−1
i }) ≥ vi(g
k
i | {g
1
i , . . . , g
k−1
i })
for all k ≥ j. This implies that in any subset of ℓ items in the optimal bundle, the highest ranked item’s marginal
contribution is at least 1/ℓ times that of this set, when the marginal contribution is counted in this way.
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attainable items at the first iteration of Phase 2. In the following lemma, we prove a lower bound
on the marginal valuation of the set of attainable items over the set of items that the algorithm has
already allocated to the agent.
Lemma 3.1. For any j ∈ [τ2i − 1],
vi(x¯
∗
i,j+1 | h1i , . . . , hji ) ≥ u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )−
j∑
t=2
kt+1i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . , ht−1i )− vi(h1i , h2i . . . , hji ) .
Proof. We prove this lemma using induction on the number of iterations t. Consider the base case
when t = 2. Agent i has already been allocated h1i . She now has at most τ¯
∗
i − k1i items left from
x¯∗i that are not yet allocated. In the next iteration the agent loses k
2
i items to other agents and
receives h2i . Each of the remaining τ¯
∗
i − k1i items have marginal utility at most vi(h1i ) over ∅. Thus,
the marginal utility of these items over h1i is also at most vi(h
1
i ). We bound the total marginal
valuation of x¯∗i,2 over {h1i }, by considering two cases.
Case 1: h1i /∈ x¯∗i,1: By monotonicity of vi, vi(x¯∗i,2 | h1i ) ≥ vi(x¯∗i,2)− vi(h1i ) = vi(x¯∗i,1 \ S2i )− vi(h1i ).
Case 2: h1i ∈ x¯∗i,1: Here, vi(x¯∗i,2 | h1i ) = vi(x¯∗i,2 ∪ {h1i })− vi(h1i ) = vi(x¯∗i,1 \ S2i )− vi(h1i ).
In both cases, submodularity of valuations and the fact that for all j ∈ S2i , vi(j) ≤ vi(h1i ) implies,
vi(x¯
∗
i,2 | h1i ) ≥ vi(x¯∗i,1)− vi(S2i )− vi(h1i ) ≥ u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )− vi(h1i ),
proving the base case. Now assume the lemma is true for all t ≤ r iterations, for some r, i.e.,
vi(x¯
∗
i,r | h1i , . . . , hr−1i ) ≥ u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )−
r−1∑
t=2
kt+1i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . , ht−1i )− vi(h1i , h2i . . . , hr−1i ).
Consider the (r + 1)st iteration. Again, we analyze two cases.
Case 1: hri /∈ x¯∗i,r:
vi(x¯
∗
i,r+1 | h1i , . . . , hri ) = vi(x¯∗i,r \ Sr+1i | h1i , . . . , hri )
≥ vi(x¯∗i,r | h1i , . . . , hri )− vi(Sr+1i | h1i , . . . , hri )
≥ vi(x¯∗i,r | h1i , . . . , hri )− vi(Sr+1i | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )
≥ vi(x¯∗i,r | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )− vi(hri | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )− vi(Sr+1i | h1i , . . . , hr−1i ).
The submodularity of vi gives the first two inequalities, and monotonicity of vi implies the last.
Case 2: hri ∈ x¯∗i,r:
vi(x¯
∗
i,r+1 | h1i , . . . , hri ) = vi(x¯∗i,r+1 ∪ {hri } | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )− vi(hri | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )
= vi(x¯
∗
i,r \ Sr+1i | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )− vi(hri | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )
≥ vi(x¯∗i,r | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )− vi(hri | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )− vi(Sr+1i | h1i , . . . , hr−1i ).
Here, the second expression follows as x¯∗i,r = x¯
∗
i,r+1 ∪ {hri } ∪ Sr+1i , and the last follows from the
definition of submodularity of the valuations.
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In both cases, from the induction hypothesis we get,
vi(x¯
∗
i,r+1 | h1i , . . . , hri ) ≥ u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )−
r−1∑
t=2
kt+1i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . , ht−1i )− vi(h1i , h2i . . . , hr−1i )
− vi(hri | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )− vi(Sr+1i | h1i , . . . , hr−1i ).
Finally, since RepReMatch assigns the item with highest marginal utility from the set of attainable
items, and each item in Sr+1i is attainable at rth iteration,
vi(x¯
∗
i,r+1 | h1i , . . . , hri ) ≥ u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )−
r−1∑
t=2
kt+1i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . , ht−1i )− vi(h1i , h2i . . . , hr−1i )
− vi(hri | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )− kr+1i vi(hri | h1i , . . . , hr−1i )
= u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )−
r∑
t=2
kt+1i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . , ht−1i )− vi(h1i , h2i . . . , hri ).
The above lemma directly allows us to give a lower bound on the marginal valuation of item
received by the agent in (j + 1)th iteration over the items received in previous iterations. We state
and prove this in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. For any j ∈ [τ2i − 1],
vi(h
j+1
i | h1i , . . . , hji ) ≥
1
τ¯∗i −
∑j+1
t=1 k
t
i
(
u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )−
j∑
t=2
kt+1i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . , ht−1i )− vi(h1i , . . . , hji )
)
.
Proof. In any setting with a set of items S = {s1, . . . sk}, and a monotone submodular valuation
v on this set, if v(S) = u, then there exists an item s ∈ S such that v(s) ≥ u/k. Thus, with
S = x¯∗i,j+1, k = τ¯∗i −
∑j+1
t=1 k
t
i , for the submodular valuation function vi(· | {h1i , . . . , hji}), we can say
that at iteration j + 1, hj+1i will have a marginal valuation at least,
1
τ¯∗i −
∑j+1
t=1 k
t
i
vi(x¯
∗
i,j+1 | h1i , . . . , hji ) .
Together with Lemma 3.1, this proves the corollary. Note that at any iteration t, if the received
item hti is from x¯
∗
i,t, then the denominator reduces further by 1, and the bound still holds.
In the following lemma, we give a lower bound on the total valuation of the items received by
the agent in Phase 2.
Lemma 3.2. vi(h
1
i , . . . , h
τ2
i
i ) ≥ u
∗
i
n .
Proof. Recall that u∗i is the valuation of the items from x¯
∗
i after she loses items in S1i to other
agents in the first iteration of Phase 2 and τ¯∗i is the number of items in x¯
∗
i . From Corollary 3.1,
total valuation of the items obtained by agent i in Phase 2 is bounded as follows.
vi(h
1
i , . . . h
τ2
i
i ) = vi(h
1
i , . . . , h
τ2
i
−1
i ) + vi(h
τ2
i
i | h1i , . . . , h
τ2
i
−1
i )
≥ vi(h1i , . . . , hτ
2
i
−1
i ) +
1
τ¯i∗ −
∑τ2
i
−1
t=0 k
t+1
i
(
u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )−
τ2
i
−1∑
t=2
kt+1i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . ht−1i )
− vi(h1i , . . . , hτ
2
i
−1
i )
)
.
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By definition, τ2i is the last iteration of Phase 2 in which agent i gets matched to some item.
After this iteration, at most n items from her optimal bundle remain unallocated, else she would
have received one more item in the (τ2i + 1)
st iteration. This means the optimal number of items
τ¯∗i −
∑τ2
i
−1
t=0 k
t+1
i ≤ n, hence the denominator of the second term in the above equation is at most
n. Again, we note here that if at any iteration t, the item assigned to agent i was from x¯∗i,t, then
the denominator will be further reduced by 1 for all such iterations, and the inequality still remains
true when kti is replaced by k
t
i + 1. Combined with the fact that an agent can lose at most n − 1
items in every iteration, we get kti ≤ n− 1, implying,
vi(h
1
i , . . . h
τ2i
i ) ≥ vi(h1i , . . . , h
τ2i −1
i ) +
1
n
(
u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )−
τ2i −1∑
t=2
kt+1i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . ht−1i )
− vi(h1i , h2i . . . , hτ
2
i
−1
i )
)
≥ vi(h1i , . . . , hτ
2
i
−1
i ) +
1
n
(
u∗i − (n− 1)vi(h1i )−
τ2
i
−1∑
t=2
(n− 1)vi(hti | h1i , . . . ht−1i )
− vi(h1i , h2i . . . , hτ
2
i −1
i )
)
= vi(h
1
i , . . . , h
τ2
i
−1
i ) +
1
n
(
u∗i − (n− 1)vi(h1i , h2i . . . , hτ
2
i
−1
i )− vi(h1i , h2i . . . , h
τ2
i
−1
i )
)
=
u∗i
n
.
Remark 3.1. In Lemma 3.1 and its subsequent Corollary 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, if u∗i − k2i vi(h1i )−∑j
t=2 k
t+1
i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . , ht−1i )− vi(h1i , . . . , hji ) becomes negative for any j ∈ [τ2i − 1], then we have
u∗i ≤ k2i vi(h1i ) +
j∑
t=2
kt+1i vi(h
t
i | h1i , . . . , ht−1i ) + vi(h1i , . . . , hji )
≤ (n− 1)vi(h1i ) +
j∑
t=2
(n − 1)vi(hti | h1i , . . . , ht−1i ) + vi(h1i , . . . , hji )
= n · vi(h1, . . . , hji ) ≤ n · vi(h1, . . . , h
τ2
i
−1
i ),
which implies that Lemma 3.2 holds.
We now bound the minimum valuation that can be obtained by every agent in Phase 3. Recall
that g1i is the item that gives the highest marginal utility over the empty set to agent i. Before
proceeding, we define
G1i := {g ∈ G | vi(g | ∅) ≥ vi(g1i | ∅)} .
Lemma 3.3. Consider the complete bipartite graph where the set of agents A, and the set of items
allocated in the first Phase of RepReMatch are the parts, and edge weights are the weighted logarithm
of the agent’s valuation for the bundle of items containing the item adjacent to the edge and items
allocated in Phase 2. That is, consider Γ(A,G = ⋃i x1i ,W = {w(i, j) = ηi log(vi({j} ∪ x2i ))}). In
this graph, there exists a matching where each agent i gets matched to an item from their highest
valued set of items G1i .
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Proof. Among all feasible matchings between the set of agents and the set of items, say T , allocated
after t iterations of Phase 1, consider the set of matchings M where each agent i whose G1i ⊆ T
is matched to some item in G1i . Arbitrarily pick a matching from M where maximum number of
agents are matched to an item from their G1i s. Denote this matching byMt. Since |
⋃
i∈S G1i | ≥ |S|
for every set S of agents, in Mt, each agent i, who is not matched to an item from their G1i , has at
least one item of G1i still unallocated after t iterations.
Let At denote the set of agents that are not matched to any item from their G1i in Mt. We
prove by induction on t that |At| ≤ n/2t.
For the base case, when t = 1, we count the number of agents who did not receive any item
from their own G1i in the maximum weight matching of the algorithm. We know that before the
first iteration, every item is unallocated. An agent will not receive any item from G1i only if all
items from this set are allocated to other agents in the matching. Hence, if α agents did not receive
any item from their G1i , all items from at least α number of G1i sets got matched to some agent(s)
in the first matching. If α < n/2, then more than n/2 agents themselves received some item from
their G1i . If α ≥ n/2, then at least α items, each from a different G1i were allocated. In either case,
releasing the allocation of the first matching releases at least n/2 items, each belonging in a distinct
agent’s G1i . Hence, in M1 at least n/2 agents receive an item from their G1i , and |A1| ≤ n/2.
For the inductive step, we assume the claim is true for the first t iterations. That is, for every
k ≤ t, in Mk, at most n/2k agents do not receive an item from their G1i ’s.
Before the (t+1)st iteration begins, we know that for every agent i in At, at least one item from
their G1i is still unallocated. Again by the reasoning of the base case, at least half of the agents in
At will have some item from their G1i allocated in the (t + 1)st matching (possibly to some other
agent). Hence, in M(t+1), |A(t+1)| ≤ |At|/2. By the inductive hypothesis, |A(t+1)| ≤ n/2(t+1).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. From Lemma 3.2,
vi(h
1
i , . . . , h
τ2
i
i ) ≥
u∗i
n
.
By Lemma 3.3, giving each agent her own g1i or some item, denoted by say h
1∗
i , that gives her
a marginal utility over ∅ at least as much as vi(g1i ) is a feasible matching before Phase 3 begins.
Therefore, we get,
NSW(x) ≥
(
n∏
i=1
(vi(h
1∗
i , h
2
i , . . . , h
τ2
i
i ))
ηi
)1/(∑n
i=1
ηi)
. (2)
Since the valuation functions are monotonic,
vi(h
1∗
i , h
2
i , . . . , h
τ2
i
i ) ≥ vi(h1∗i ) ≥ vi(g1i ) .
Phase 1 of the algorithm runs for ⌈log n⌉ iterations and each iteration allocates n items. Thus,
|x∗i \ x¯∗i | ≤ n⌈log n⌉ and |S1i | ≤ n implying, |(x∗i \ x¯∗i ) ∪ S1i | ≤ n(log n+ 2). Thus,
vi(g
1
i ) ≥
1
n(log n+ 2)
vi((x
∗
i \ x¯∗i ) ∪ S1i ) .
Also,
vi(h
1∗
i , h
1
i , . . . , h
τ2
i
i ) ≥ vi(h1i , . . . , h
τ2
i
i ) ≥
u∗i
n
=
1
n
vi(x¯
∗
i \ S1i ) .
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Thus,
vi(h
1∗
i , h
1
i , . . . , h
τ2
i
i ) ≥
1
2
(
1
n(log n+ 2)
vi((x
∗
i \ x¯∗i ) ∪ S1i ) +
1
n
vi(x¯
∗
i \ S1i )
)
≥ 1
2
1
n(log n+ 2)
vi(((x
∗
i \ x¯∗i ) ∪ S1i ) ∪ (x¯∗i \ S1i ))
=
1
2
1
n(log n+ 2)
vi(x
∗
i ) .
The second inequality follows from the submodularity of valuations. The last bound, together with
(2) gives,
NSW(x) ≥
(
n∏
i=1
(
1
2
1
n(log n+ 2)
vi(x
∗
i )
)ηi)1/∑i ηi
≥ 1
2
1
n(log n+ 2)
OPT .
Remark 3.2. We remark that even if Phases 1 and 2 perform some kind of repeated matchings, the
edge weight definitions make them different. In the proof of Lemma 3.3, we require that a maximum
weight matching matches agents to items according to agent valuations for the single item. That
is, in all iterations of Phase 1, the edge weights of the graph in the future are the valuation of the
agent for the set containing the single item, and not the increase in the agent’s valuation upon
adding this item to her current allocation. These quantities are different when the valuations are
submodular. For lower bounding the valuation from the lower ranked items, we need to consider
the marginal increase, as defined in Phase 2. However, Lemma 3.3 may not hold true if marginal
increase in valuations is considered for the initial iterations, hence Phase 1 is required.
4 Hardness of Approximation
We complement our results for the submodular case with a e(e−1) -factor hardness of approximation.
Formally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial time e(e−1) -factor approximation algorithm
for the submodular NSW problem, even when agents are symmetric and have identical valuations.
Proof. We show this using the hardness of approximation result of the ALLOCATION problem
proved in [KLMM08]. We first summarize the relevant parts of [KLMM08]. The ALLOCATION
problem is to find an allocation of a set of indivisible items among a set of agents with monotone
submodular utilities for the items, such that the sum of the utilities of all agents is maximized.
Note that if the valuation functions were additive, the problem is trivial, and an optimal allocation
gives every item to the agent who values it the most. To obtain a hardness of approximation result
for the submodular case, the MAX-3-COLORING problem is reduced to the ALLOCATION problem.
MAX-3-COLORING, the problem of determining what fraction of edges of a graph can be properly
colored when 3 colors are used to colors all vertices of the graph, is known to be NP-Hard to
approximate within some constant factor c. The reduction from MAX-3-COLORING generates an
instance of ALLOCATION with symmetric agents having identical submodular valuation functions
for the items. The reduction is such that for instances of MAX-3-COLORING with optimal value
1, the corresponding ALLOCATION instance has an optimal value of nV , where n is the number
of agents in the instance, and V is a function of the input parameters of MAX-3-COLORING. In
this case, every agent receives a set of items of utility V . For instances of MAX-3-COLORING with
17
optimal value at most c, it is shown that the optimal sum of utilities of the resulting ALLOCATION
instance cannot be higher than (1− 1/e)nV .
For proving hardness of submodular NSW problem, observe that the input of the ALLOCATION
and NSW problems are the same. So, we consider the instance generated by the reduction as that
of an NSW maximizing problem. From the results of [KLMM08], we can prove the following claims.
• If the optimal value of MAX-3-COLORING is 1, then the NSW of the reduced instance is V .
As every agent receives a set of items of value V , the NSW is also V .
• If the optimal value of MAX-3-COLORING is at most c, then the NSW is at most (1− 1/e)V .
Applying the AM-GM inequality establishes that the NSW is at most 1/n times the sum of
utilities, which is proven to be at most (1− 1/e)nV .
As MAX-3-COLORING cannot be approximated within a factor c, thus NSW of a problem with
submodular utilities cannot be approximated within a factor e(e−1) .
As the ALLOCATION problem now considered as an NSW problem had symmetric agents and
identical submodular valuation functions, the NSW problem also satisfies these properties.
5 Special Cases
5.1 Submodular NSW with Constant Number of Agents
In this section, we describe a constant factor algorithm for a special case of the submodular NSW
problem. Specifically, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. For any constant ǫ > 0 and a constant number of agents n ≥ 2, there is a (1−1/e−
ǫ)-factor approximation algorithm for the NSW problem with monotone submodular valuations, in
the value oracle model. Additionally, this is the best possible factor independent of n, and any
factor better than (1− (1− 1/n)n + ǫ) would require exponentially many queries, unless P = NP.
The key results that establish this result are from the theory of submodular function max-
imization developed in [CVZ10]. The broad approach for approximately maximizing a discrete
monotone submodular function is to optimize a popular continuous relaxation of the same, called
the multilinear extension, and round the solution using a randomized rounding scheme. We will
use an algorithm that approximately maximizes multiple discrete submodular functions, described
in [CVZ10], as the main subroutine of our algorithm for the submodular NSW problem, hence first
we give an overview of it, starting with a definition of the multilinear extension.
Definition 5.1 (Multilinear Extension of a submodular function). Given a discrete submodular
function f : 2m → R+, its multilinear extension F : [0, 1]m → R+, at a point y ∈ [0, 1]m, is defined
as the expected value of f(z) at a point z ∈ {0, 1}m obtained by rounding y such that each coordinate
yi is rounded to 1 with probability yi, and to 0 otherwise. That is,
F (y) = E[f(z)] =
∑
X⊆[m]
f(X)
∏
i∈X
yi
∏
i/∈X
(1− yi).
The following theorem proves that the multilinear extensions of multiple discrete submodular
functions defined over a matroid polytope can be simultaneously approximated to optimal values
within constant factors.
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Theorem 5.2. [CVZ10] Consider monotone submodular functions f1, . . . , fn : 2
N → R+, their
multilinear extensions Fi : [0, 1]
N → R+ and a matroid polytope P ⊆ [0, 1]N . There is a polynomial
time algorithm which, given V1, ..., Vn ∈ R+, either finds a point x ∈ P such that Fi(x) ≥ (1−1/e)Vi
for each i, or returns a certificate that there is no point x ∈ P such that Fi(x) ≥ Vi for all i.
Given a discrete monotone submodular function f defined over a matroid, a rounding scheme
called the swap rounding algorithm can be applied to round a solution of its multilinear extension
to a feasible point in the domain of f , which is an independent set of the matroid. At a high level,
in the rounding scheme, it is first shown that every solution of the multilinear extension can be
expressed as a convex combination of independent sets such that for any two sets S0 and S1 in the
convex combination, there is at least one element in each set that is not present in the other, that
is ∃e0 ∈ S0\S1 and ∃e1 ∈ S1\S0 . The rounding method then iteratively merges two arbitrarily
chosen sets S0 and S1 into one new set as follows. Until both sets are not the same, one set Si is
randomly chosen with probability proportional to the coefficient of its original version in the convex
combination βi, that is Si is chosen with probability βi/(β0 + β1), and altered by removing ei from
it and adding e1−i. The coefficient of the new set obtained by this merge process is the sum of
those of the sets merged, i.e., β0 + β1.
The following lower tail bound proves that with high probability, the loss in the function value
by swap rounding is not too much.
Theorem 5.3. [CVZ10] Let f : {0, 1}n → R+ be a monotone submodular function with marginal
values in [0, 1], and F : [0, 1]n → R+ its multilinear extension. Let (x1, ..., xn) ∈ P (M) be a point
in a matroid polytope and (X1, ...,Xn) ∈ {0, 1}n a random solution obtained from it by randomized
swap rounding. Let µ0 = F (x1, ..., xn) and δ > 0. Then
Pr[f(X1, ...,Xn) ≤ (1− δ)µ0] ≤ e−µ0δ2/8.
In short, for a matroid M(X, I), given monotone submodular functions fi : {0, 1}m → R+, i ∈
[n] over the matroid polytope, and values vi, i ∈ [n], there is an efficient algorithm that determines
if there is an independent set S ∈ I such that fi(S) ≥ (1− 1/e)vi for every i.
To use this algorithm to solve the submodular NSW problem, we define a matroid M(X, I)
as follows. This construction was first described in [LLN06], and also used for approximating the
submodular welfare in [Von08]. From the sets of agents A and items G, we define the ground
set X = A × G. The independent sets are all feasible integral allocations I = {S ⊆ X | ∀j :
|S ∩{A×{j}}| ≤ 1}. The valuation functions of every agent ui : {0, 1}m → R+ translate naturally
to submodular functions over this matroid fi : I → R+, with fi(S) = ui(Gi), where Gi = {j ∈ G |
(i, j) ∈ S}. With this construction, for any set of values Vi, i ∈ [n], checking if there is an integral
allocation of items that gives valuations at least (approximately) Vi to each agent i is equivalent to
checking if there is an independent set in this matroid that has value Vi for every agent i.
The algorithm for approximating the NSW is now straightforward, and given in Algorithm 3.
Essentially, we guess the optimal NSW value OPT , and the utility of every agent in the optimal
allocation Vi, and check if there is an allocation X that gives every agent i a bundle of value at least
(approximately) Vi. As every agent can receive at most Max utility, Max is a trivial upper bound
for the maximum value of NSW, hence we perform a binary search for the optimal value in the range
(0,Max]. Searching for sets Vi by enumerating only those sets with values that are powers of (1+δ)
for some constant δ > 0 will reduce the time complexity of the algorithm to O(poly(log(Max)/δ))
instead of O(poly(Max)), by changing the approximation factor to (1− 1/e)(1− δ) ≤ (1− 1/e− ǫ)
for some ǫ > 0.
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Algorithm 3: Approximate the Submodular NSW with constant number of agents
Input : A set A of n agents with weights ηi, ∀i ∈ A, a set G of m indivisible items, and
monotone submodular valuations ui : 2G → R+.
Output: An allocation that approximates the NSW.
1 For any value Max > 0 that is a power of (1 + δ), scale all valuation functions such that
ui(G) = Max for all i. // Max is an upper bound on NSW objective
2 OPT = Max // OPT is the optimal NSW objective
3 define β > 0, δ > 0 as small positive constants
4 while OPT ≤Max do
5 flag=0
6 for any set in V = {[V1, V2, . . . , Vn] | ∏i Vi = OPT,∀i : Vi = (1 + δ)ki for some ki} do
7 if there is an allocation x of G such that ui(xi) ≥ (1− 1/e)Vi for all i then
8 x∗ = x, f lag = 1 // flag = 1 if current OPT value is feasible
9 end
10 end
11 if flag=1 then
12 OPT = OPT + (Max+ β −OPT )/2 // search if a higher value is also
feasible. Adding β ensures OPT > Max finally, and algorithm
converges
13 else
14 Max = OPT , OPT = OPT/2 // search for a lower feasible value
15 end
16 OPT = nearest power of (1 + δ) greater than OPT
17 Max = nearest power of (1 + δ) greater than Max
18 end
19 return x∗
The hardness claim in Theorem 5.1 follows from the proof of Theorem 4.1. It was shown that
in the case where the optimal value of the MAX-3-COLORING instance was 1, every agent in the
reduced NSW instance received a bundle of items of value V , else the total NSW could not be more
than (1− (1− 1/n)n)V .
5.2 Symmetric Additive NSW
We now prove that SMatch gives an allocation that also satisfies the EF1 property, making it not
only approximately efficient but also a fair allocation. EF1 is formally defined as follows.
Definition 5.2 ([Bud11]). Envy-Free up to one item (EF1): An allocation x of m indivisible items
among n agents satisfies the envy-free up to one item property, if for any pair of agents i, iˆ, either
vi(xi) ≥ vi(xiˆ), or there exists some item g ∈ xiˆ such that vi(xi) ≥ vi(xiˆ\{g}).
That is, if an agent i values another agent iˆ’s allocation more than her own, which is termed
commonly by saying agent i envies agent iˆ, then there must be some item in iˆ’s allocation upon
whose removal this envy is eliminated.
Theorem 5.4. The output of SMatch satisfies the EF1 fairness property.
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Proof. For every agent i and j ≥ 1, the item hij allocated to i in the jth iteration of SMatch is
valued more by i than all items hi
′
k , k > j allocated to any other agent i
′ in the future iterations, as
otherwise i would have been matched to the other higher valued item in the jth matching. Hence,
j∑
t=1
vi(h
i
t) ≥
j∑
t=2
vi(h
i′
t ). That is, after removing the first item h
i′
1 from any agent’s bundle, the sum
of valuations of the remaining items for agent i is not higher than her current total valuation. Thus,
after removing the item allocated to any agent in the first matching, agent i does not envy the
remaining bundle, making the allocation EF1.
Remark 5.1. We note that the same proof implies that our algorithm satisfies the strong EF1
property, defined in [CFSV19]. Intuitively, an allocation satisfies the strong EF1 property if upon
removing the same item from agent i bundle, no other agent j envies i, for all i and j. Formally,
Definition 5.3 (Strong EF1). An allocation x satisfies strong EF1 if for every agent i ∈ A, there
exists an item gi ∈ xi such that no other agent envies the set xi\{gi}, i.e., ∀j ∈ A, vj(xj) ≥
vj(xi\{gi}).
5.3 Symmetric Restricted Additive NSW
For the special case when the valuations are restricted, meaning the valuation of any item vij
is either some value vj or 0, we now prove SMatch gives a constant factor approximation to the
optimal NSW.
Theorem 5.5. SMatch solves the symmetric NSW problem for restricted additive valuations within
a factor 1.45 of the optimal.
Proof. We prove that x∗, the allocation returned by SMatch, is Pareto Optimal (PO). Combined
with the statement of Theorem 5.4, and a result of [BKV18] which proves that any allocation that
satisfies both EF1 and PO approximates NSW with symmetric, additive valuations within a 1.45
factor, we get the required result. An allocation of items x is called Pareto Optimal when there
is no other allocation x′ where every agent gets at least as much utility as in x, and at least one
agent gets higher utility. In the restricted valuations case, every item adds valuation either 0 or vj
to some agent’s utility. Thus, the sum of valuations of all agents in any allocation is at most
∑
j vj .
Observe that SMatch can easily be modified so that it allocates every item to some agent who has
non zero valuation for it. Then, the sum of valuations of all agents in the allocation returned by
SMatch is
∑
j vj . No other allocation can give an agent strictly higher utility without decreasing
another agent’s utility. Hence, x∗ is a Pareto Optimal allocation.
Remark 5.2. We remark that Theorem 5.4 also holds for general additive valuations. However,
for the general case, the PO property does not always hold. Consider for example the case where
we have two agents {A,B} and four items {g1, g2, g3, g4}. Agent A values the items at {2+ ǫ, 2, ǫ, ǫ}
and agent B values them at {1, 1, 1, 1}. SMatch allocates items g1, g3 to agent A and items g2, g4
to agent B. However, we can swap items g2 and g3 to get an allocation that Pareto dominates the
allocation output by the algorithm.
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6 Tightness of the analysis
6.1 Subadditive Valuations
The matching approach does not extend to agents with subadditive valuation functions. Here the
valuation functions satisfy the subadditivity property:
v(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ v(S1) + v(S2),
for any subsets S1,S2 of the set of items G.
A counter example that exhibits the shortcomings of the approach is as follows. Consider
an instance with 2 agents and m items. Assume m is even. Denote the set of items by G =
{g1, g2, . . . , gm}. Let G1 = {g1, g2, . . . , gm/2} and G2 = {gm/2+1, . . . , gm}. The valuation function for
agent i ∈ {1, 2} is as follows.
vi(S) = vi(S1 ∪ S2) = max{M, |Si| ·M} ∀S ⊆ G, S1 ⊆ G1, S2 ⊆ G2.
Note that these valuation functions are subadditive, but not submodular.
The allocation that maximizes the NSW allocates G1 to agent 1 and G2 to agent 2. The optimal
NSW is mM/2.
Now, RepReMatch may proceed in the following way. Since the marginal utility of each item
over ∅ is M, the algorithm can pick any of the items for either of the agents. Suppose the algorithm
gives gm/2+1 to agent 1 and g1 to agent 2. In the next iteration, for agent 1 (2) the marginal utility
of any item over gm/2+1 (g1) is 0. Thus, again the algorithm is at liberty to allocate any item to
either of the agents. Now again the algorithm gives exactly opposite allocation as compared to
the optimal allocation and gives agent 1 item gm/2+2 and gives agent 2 item g2. For each iteration
this process repeats and ultimately the bundles allocated by algorithm are exactly opposite of the
bundles allocated by optimal. The re-matching step first releases ⌈log n⌉ matchings, or 2 items from
both agent allocations, and re-matches them. This may not change the allocations as both agents
have already received their best item. The NSW of the algorithm’s allocation is (M2)1/2 = M,
giving an approximation ratio of Ω(m) with the optimal NSW. Even if we increase the number of
agents, the factor cannot be made independent of m, the number of items.
The problem in the subadditive case is the myopic nature of each iteration in RepReMatch. In
each iteration the algorithm only sees one step ahead. At any of the iterations, had the algorithm
been allowed to pick and allocate multiple items instead of 1, it would have been able to select a
subset of items from its correct optimal bundle.
This problem does not arise in the additive case because the valuation of an item here is
independent of other items. Submodular valuations allow a minimum marginal utility over an
agent’s current allocation for items allocated in future iterations, hence this issue does not arise
there too.
6.2 XOS Valuations
The following example shows that RepReMatch does not extend to XOS valuations either. XOS is
a class of valuation functions that falls between subadditive and submodular valuation functions,
defined as follows. A set of additive valuation functions, say {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk}, is given, and the XOS
valuation of a set of items S is the maximum valuation of this set according to any of these additive
valuations. i.e., v(S) = maxi∈[k]{ℓi(S)}.
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To see why the algorithm does not extend to this class of functions, consider the following
counter example. We have n = 2 agents and m = 2k items, for some k > 3. Each agent i ∈ {1, 2}
has 2 valuation functions ℓi1, ℓ
i
2. The following two tables pictorially depict these valuations. Each
entry (ℓih, gj), h ∈ [2], i ∈ [2], j ∈ [2k] denotes agent i’s valuation according to function ℓih for item
gj .
For agent 1:
g1 g2 . . . gk gk+1 gk+2 gk+3 gk+4 . . . g2k
ℓ11 M M . . . M 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
ℓ12 0 0 . . . 0 M + ǫ M + ǫ M + ǫ ǫ . . . ǫ
For agent 2:
g1 g2 g3 g4 . . . gk gk+1 gk+2 . . . g2k
ℓ21 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 M M . . . M
ℓ22 M+ǫ M+ǫ M+ǫ ǫ . . . ǫ 0 0 . . . 0
Here M is any large value, and ǫ > 0 is negligible.
The allocation optimizing NSW clearly allocates the first k items to agent 1 and the next k items
to agent 2, resulting in the NSW value Mk. RepReMatch on the other hand allocates items g1, g2 to
agent 2 and items gk+1, gk+2 to agent 1 in Phase 1. In Phase 2, it gives g3 to agent 2 and gk+3 to
agent 1. After this, for all other iterations of Phase 2, items gj , j ≤ k have zero marginal utility for
agent 1 and items gj , j ≥ (k+1) have zero marginal utility for agent 2. Thus, RepReMatch allocates
items g3 . . . gk to agent 2 and items gk+3, . . . , g2k to agent 1 in Phase 2. Phase 3 reallocates items of
Phase 1 − g1, g2, gk+1, gk+2 allocating gk+1, gk+2 to agent 1 and g1, g2 to agent 2. Thus the NSW of
the allocation given by RepReMatch is (3M + k · ǫ). Hence, the approximation ratio of RepReMatch
cannot be better than (MK)/(3M + kǫ) or Ω(k) = Ω(m) when the valuation functions are XOS.
6.3 Asymmetric Additive NSW
We describe an example to prove the analysis of this case is tight. Consider an NSW instance with
n agents, referred by {1, 2 . . . , n} and m sets of n2 items, referred by G = {Gi | i ∈ [m]}, where
every Gi = {gi,1 . . . , gi,n2}}. The first agent has weight W , while the remaining agents have weight
1. The valuation function of agent 1 is as follows.
v1(gi,j) =
{
M j ∈ [n], i ∈ [m]
0 otherwise.
The remaining agents have valuations for items as follows.
∀k ∈ [n], k 6= 1 : vk(gi,j) =


M + ǫ j ∈ [n], i ∈ [m], ǫ > 0
M + ǫ¯ (k − 1)n + 1 ≤ j ≤ kn, i ∈ [m], ǫ > ǫ¯ > 0
0 otherwise.
It is easy to verify that the optimal allocation that maximizes NSW gives all items gi,j for i between
(k − 1)n+ 1 and kn to agent k. That is, the kth agent receives the kth set of n items from each of
the m sets of n2 items. SMatch on the other hand allocates items as follows. For the first graph,
it computes ui as M(m− 2)n for the first agent, and (M + ǫ)(m− 2)n+ (M + ǫ′)(mn) for a small
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ǫ′ > 0, for the rest. The first max weight matching then allocates to each agent one item from agent
1’s optimal bundle. The following iterations also err as follows. Until the first n items from every
set are allocated, irrespective of the agent weights, every agent receives one item from this set if
available. In the remaining matchings, agent 1 does not receive any item, and the other agents get
all items in their optimal bundles. The ratio of the NSW products of the optimal allocation and
the algorithm’s allocation is as follows.
NSW(x)
OPT
≤
(
(mM)W (mn · (M + ǫ¯) +m(M + ǫ))n−1
(mn ·M)W (mn · (M + ǫ¯))n−1
)1/(W+(n−1))
≤
(
(mM)W (2mn ·M)n−1
(mn ·M)W (mn ·M)n−1
)1/(W+(n−1))
≤ 2
(
1
n
)W/(W+(n−1))
.
With increasing W , asymptotically this ratio approaches 2/n.
Remark 6.1. It is natural to ask if the asymmetric NSW problem is harder than the symmetric
problem. As SMatch is the first non-trivial algorithm for the asymmetric problem, we would like to
find if it gives a better approximation factor when applied to a symmetric agents instance. However,
after considerable effort, we could not resolve this question definitively. Like the above example, we
could not find an example of a symmetric instance for which our analysis was tight. Our conjecture
is that SMatch gives a better factor for the symmetric problem, and that the symmetric case itself
is easier than the asymmetric NSW case.
7 Conclusions
In this work, we have shown two algorithms SMatch and RepReMatch. SMatch approximately
maximizes the NSW for the asymmetric additive case within a factor of O(n), while RepReMatch
optimizes the asymmetric submodular NSW within a factor of O(n log n). We also completely
resolve the submodular NSW problem for the case when there are a constant number of agents,
with an e/(e−1) approximation factor algorithm, and a matching hardness of approximation proof.
Our algorithms also satisfy other interesting fairness guarantees for smaller special cases, namely,
EF1 for the additive valuations case, and a better 1.45 factor approximation for the symmetric
agents with restricted additive valuations case.
Our work has initiated the investigation of the NSW problem for general cases, and raises several
interesting questions. First, we ask if the approximation factor O(n), given by SMatch, is the best
possible for the asymmetric additive NSW problem. While SMatch cannot give better than a linear
factor guarantee, as proved by an example in Section 6.3, there could be another algorithm with a
sub-linear approximation factor.
Another problem is the special case where the agent weights are separated by a constant factor.
Approaches known for the symmetric NSW problem fail to extend even to the highly restricted case
when agent weights are either 1 or 2. SMatch does not seem to give a better guarantee for this case
either, and we ask if this question is easier than the general asymmetric agents case. One way to
resolve this query is to find an algorithm with an approximation factor equal to some polynomial
function of the ratio of the largest to smallest weight.
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A third direction is to resolve the symmetric NSW problem for valuation functions that are more
general than additive(-like). For instance, the symmetric agents with OXS valuations (defined in
[LLN06]) case has not been explored yet.
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